Introduction
International investment treaties have proliferated in recent years. The number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) is continuing to rise, despite having reached already impressive numbers. At the end of 2009, a total of 2,750 BITs had been concluded (UNCTAD 2010: 81) .
Another salient trend is the increase in numbers of regional trade agreements (RTAs): 474
RTAs had been notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as of July 2010. 1 What is less well known is that the proliferation of RTAs has taken place jointly with a trend towards a transformation of the content of RTAs. These have moved from focusing exclusively on issues related to trade in goods, to encompassing a wider set of areas such as trade in services, intellectual property, movement of business persons, and also investment.
According to UNCTAD (2010: 81) , 295 agreements with investment provisions -apart from
BITs and double taxation agreements -had been signed at the end of 2009.
While an increasing number of studies investigated the impact of BITs and RTAs on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, the empirical evidence has remained highly ambiguous. 2 This is not really surprising: most of the earlier studies treat BITs and RTAs as "black boxes." In particular, it is typically ignored that international trade and investment treaties differ in whether or not they contain important legal innovations that diffused over the last two decades. The first institutional variance concerns the degree to which international agreements allow for denationalized and depoliticized dispute settlement, i.e., whether foreign investors can sue host country governments before a transnational tribunal.
The majority of earlier BITs, for example, does not allow for strong investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) which has been included in most BITs and also in RTAs negotiated since the mid-1990s (Yackee 2007: 28) . The second institutional variance relates to the way in which BITs and RTAs provide for liberalization commitments. 3 Many RTAs, starting with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the mid-1990s, include investment provisions providing for pre-establishment national treatment (NT), thus restricting the ability of host governments to discriminate with respect to the admission of foreign investments. But such liberal NT provisions remain the exception in BITs.
In this paper, we overcome serious limitations of the previous literature by looking inside the "black box" of international trade and investment agreements. We focus on analyzing the impact of ISDS provisions as well as NT provisions for the pre-establishment phase on bilateral FDI flows between 1978 and 2004. In contrast to some recent studies surveyed in Section 2, we account for such provisions in both BITs and RTAs; we also account for the impact of NT provisions extended through pre-establishment most-favoured nation (MFN) clauses. At the same time, we cover a large sample of developing host countries as well as some newly emerging source countries of FDI to mitigate sample selection biases. We employ various estimation methods to check for the robustness of our results.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the relevance of major investment provisions, introduces the classification of international trade and investment treaties, and reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the gravity-type model that is used as well as the data employed. Section 4 reports the main results, while Section 5 concludes.
Major Investment Provisions: Relevance and Related Literature
The central proposition guiding the analysis in this paper is that the extent to which international trade and investment agreements attract FDI from other parties depends on the inclusion and strength of key investment provisions in these agreements. In other words, we relax the unrealistic assumption underlying large parts of the previous literature that RTAs and BITs are homogenous. The type of obligations they contain differs, as does the depth of obligations that are relevant for regulating the establishment and operation of FDI projects.
Two investment provisions appear to be particularly relevant as they constitute important legal innovations relating to the liberalization and protection of FDI: (i) guarantees of market access for foreign investors, i.e., the extent to which international trade and investment agreements include provisions on NT and MFN treatment in the preestablishment phase; and (ii) credible commitments by means of strong dispute settlement mechanisms against discriminatory and discretionary treatment once foreign investors have located in a host country. We discuss both aspects in reverse order.
BITs and RTAs are widely perceived to be commitment devices that help developing host countries to overcome a problem described by Vernon (1971) as the "obsolescing bargain". The need for credible legal protection against discriminatory and discretionary treatment results from the incentive of host country governments to modify the terms of investment in the post-establishment phase, in order to increase the host country's share in host country governments unless time inconsistency problems were overcome through binding enforcement mechanisms (Büthe and Milner 2008; The approach taken in some agreements provides for most predictability of access conditions by adopting a negative-list modality to liberalization. Accordingly, all sectors are considered to be fully consistent with NT in the pre-establishment phase, unless specifically provided for in annexes listing all the non-conforming measures maintained and other reservations. This approach is followed, for example, by NAFTA and many subsequent
RTAs. Only a few of the BITs that cover pre-establishment NT adopt such an approach, namely the recent US-Uruguay, US-Rwanda, and Japan-Uzbekistan BITs. This approach has the merit of principally covering all sectors and providing clarity as to which non-conforming restrictions are maintained or can be introduced. It has two further advantages for investors.
First, it tends to bind access at the actual level of openness, as the main presumption is that the reservations contained in the annex are for existing non-conforming measures. 9 Second, unilateral liberalization after the entry into force of the treaty is automatically bound at these lower levels of restrictiveness, meaning that going back to previously maintained restrictions is not possible.
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The second approach is similar to the one described above, with the exception that detailed lists of non-conforming measures are not provided. Nevertheless, the NT obligation applies in principle to all sectors for the pre-establishment phase, and non-conforming measures are bound at existing levels of restrictiveness, unless specified otherwise. Such an approach is followed in various Canadian BITs, as well as in most US BITs.
The third approach is less liberal as the NT obligation for pre-establishment solely applies to services sectors. It normally does so through a positive-list modality, meaning that, instead of applying fully to all sectors unless specified otherwise, the liberalization obligation only applies to sectors specifically listed. For services sectors not listed, as well as for nonservices sectors, there is no guarantee of access whatsoever, as any type of entry barrier can be imposed, at any level and at any time. For the services sectors listed, levels of access are bound; but, unlike the previous approaches mentioned, these do not necessarily reflect existing levels of access, nor is there a ratchet to ensure that future liberalization is guaranteed. The third approach mimics the approach used under the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It has been followed in a few RTAs, e.g., USJordan, ASEAN, and Mercosur.
As noted before, the empirical literature on the effects of international agreements on BITs (e.g., those signed by the United States) actually have more extensive investment disciplines than the investment chapters in various RTAs.
We overcome these limitations in the subsequent analysis. In the next section, we present the gravity-type model used to assess the impact of investment liberalization modalities as well as dispute settlement provisions in BITs and RTAs on bilateral FDI flows, and we discuss methodological choices and the data employed.
Method and Data
We estimate a gravity-type model on the determinants of FDI. Such models have been used 
where FDI ijt stands for bilateral FDI flows from country i to country j in period t, and FDI it for total FDI flows from country i to all (developing) countries included in our sample.
13 X jt represents a set of control variables (see below). RTA/BIT_with_NT ijt corresponds to a variable capturing the extent to which BITs and RTAs incorporate liberalizing modalities on NT for the admission of foreign investments. It ranges from 0 to 3, and reflects the coding discussed in the preceding section: 3 for agreements with negative-list modalities providing for a detailed list of non-conforming measures; 2 for agreements with negative-list modalities but without detailed lists of non-conforming measures; 1 for agreements that use a positive-13 Negative FDI flows (for three-year averages) are set equal to zero to include as many observations as possible.
list approach for investments in services sectors; and 0 for pairs of countries that are not bound by a NT obligation in a BIT or RTA that covers the admission phase.
14 RTA/BIT_w/o_NT ijt corresponds to a ratified RTA or BIT without NT provisions covering the admission of foreign investments; this dummy variable is set equal to one, if RTA/BIT_with_NT ijt takes the value of zero. We include a set of year dummies λ t as well as source-year effects μ it to achieve a consistent estimate of the impact of NT modalities on bilateral FDI; ε ijt represents the error term.
As a number of previous studies, we use FDI flows as our dependent variable variable is the share of FDI attracted by a specific host country in total FDI flows from the source country under consideration to all developing host countries in our sample. This measure captures the attractiveness of a particular developing country relative to others. This is consistent with arguments to the effect that a motivation for developing countries to sign investment agreements is to divert FDI away from competing locations (Elkins et al. 2006) . 15 We calculate three-year averages of FDI flows so as to smooth the year-to-year fluctuations in the data.
We use a fairly standard set of control variables. We include total real host country GDP and real GDP Growth, host country Inflation, host country Openness to trade, and the difference in GDP per capita between the source and the host country (DiffGDPpc).
Moreover, we incorporate dummies for the existence of a double taxation treaty (DTT) and a common currency (ComCurr), which serve to control for cases of deeper regional integration.
We expect a positive association of GDP, Growth, DiffGDPpc, RTA, DTT, and ComCurr with FDI; the opposite applies to Inflation as our proxy for macroeconomic distortions.
PolCon reflects political constraints on the executive branch and is included as a control variable as poor institutions may discourage FDI by giving rise to uncertainty. We use the index developed by Henisz (2000) , which is available for a large number of years and countries. With higher values of PolCon meaning less policy discretion, we expect a positive link between PolCon and FDI flows. 16 We take the natural logarithm of FDI, GDP, DiffGDPpc, and Inflation to reduce the skewness in the data. To keep the zero and negative observations, we use the following logarithmic transformation: To avoid the sample selection bias that has plagued large parts of the literature, we include the maximum number of 28 source and 83 (developing) host countries for which data on bilateral FDI flows are available, excluding financial offshore centres such as the Bahamas or Cayman Islands. As concerns the hosts of FDI, we follow most previous studies and consider developing countries only. This is consistent with the intent of BITs to promote FDI flows to developing countries. Moreover, RTAs with investment provisions are most often concluded between developed and developing countries. South-South agreements on investment are also increasing, in particular involving higher-income developing countries, while North-North RTAs with investment provisions tend to be the exception so far (e.g., US-Australia). Our sample includes a large number of poor developing host countries, which is crucial to avoid a sample selection bias. At the same time, our sample of 28 source countries of FDI includes several non-OECD economies, thereby capturing at least partly the recent emergence of FDI flows between developing countries. 17 We employ different estimation techniques to check the robustness of our results. For a start, we estimate a simple ordinary least square (OLS) fixed-effects model. Subsequently, we estimate a fixed-effects Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) model to account for the fact that the sample includes a large number of zero observations. Finally, we account for possible endogeneity of trade and investment treaties (and some control variables) by employing a dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. More specifically, we use the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995) . Table 1 . The only notable exceptions refer to columns (5) and (7) where DiffGDPpc, Inflation, and DTT prove to be insignificant at conventional levels. This can be attributed to the fact that the number of observations is cut almost by half once we account for ISDS provisions in BITs (see below for details).
Results

OLS fixed-effects estimations
We apply a step-wise approach of accounting for important treaty provisions in columns (2)- (7) In the remaining columns of Table 1 , we take a broader perspective by accounting for treaty provisions in both RTAs and BITs. The major result holds in column (4): once again treaties with liberal admission rules have a significantly positive impact on FDI flows, at the one percent level. However, the coefficient of RTA/BIT_with_NT is smaller than that of RTA_with_NT before. The weaker impact of NT provisions in column (4) is probably because strict NT provisions are still relatively rare in BITs, as compared to RTAs (see Section 2).
18 RTAs (and also BITs) without pre-consent or no investor-state procedure altogether are coded as zero. 19 We also tested for possible interaction effects between RTAs with more liberal NT provisions and RTAs with stronger ISDS provisions. One could have expected that RTAs combining both types of provisions have a greater impact on FDI flows than those that did not. In other words, the effect of liberal admission rules could have been reinforced by better ex-post protection, and vice versa. However, we did not find evidence supporting this hypothesis; results are not shown for the sake of brevity. This is also reflected in the summary statistics in Appendix B where the mean of
RTA_with_NT increases just slightly when combining RTAs and BITs in RTA/BIT_with_NT.
More strikingly, RTAs and BITs without NT provisions differ from each other in that the effect of the latter on FDI proves to be significantly positive. Technically speaking, the positive coefficient of BIT_w/o_NT follows logically from the significant BIT dummy in columns (1)- (3), in combination with the fact that just a few BITs include strict NT provisions. The economic inference appears to be that foreign investors tend to regard BITs as a broader set of similarly important investment provisions, rather than carefully checking the multitude of BITs for specific provisions. Note also that negotiations of BITs tend to be a technical procedure conducted on the basis of ready-made model texts. By contrast, the negotiation and ratification process of RTAs tend to be highly politicized and attract considerable public attention. Rule setting in RTAs covers a much wider area than in BITs, and foreign investors are aware that RTAs are mainly about trade liberalization.
As noted before, the significance and size of some control variables is affected in column (5) Before turning to alternative estimation methods we offer a further extension of our analysis -in columns (6) and (7) -by taking account of MFN obligations in RTAs and BITs that relate to the pre-establishment phase. MFN clauses, in principle, bind a party to extend to the other party any more favourable treatment granted to a non-party. Such clauses can help 20 Yackee (2009) In columns (6) and (7), we also include two additional variables to control for the host country's membership in the WTO (and previously the GATT) and the breadth of sectoral commitments in the host country's GATS schedule, which includes commitments on the establishment and operation of services firms from other WTO members. However, these additional controls are always insignificant and have no influence on the results for the other variables. Furthermore, the extension by MFN obligations found in RTAs and BITs hardly affects our major results and does not offer additional insights. The effect of NT provisions is slightly weaker in the full sample when comparing the results in columns (4) and (6), while still significant at the one percent level. Likewise, the effect of NT provisions weakens somewhat for the reduced sample with information on ISDS provisions in BITs, i.e., comparing the results in columns (5) and (6). Taken together, it appears that indirect effects working through MFN obligations play no significant role in stimulating bilateral FDI flows.
Alternative estimation methods
In order to check whether the previous OLS results are biased, we employ two alternative estimation methods in the following: (i) a fixed-effects Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) model accounting for the fact that the sample includes a large number of zero 22 As is well known, the inclusion of MFN clauses in trade agreements helped foster freer trade in Europe from the mid-19 century to World War I. 23 For example, Bangladesh and Japan may have ratified a BIT with each other that provides for admission rights. Bangladesh may also have signed an agreement with a third country, say Mexico, where it did not provide for NT as regards admission, but has committed to grant Mexico MFN as regards admission of foreign investments. In other words, by granting a certain level of treatment for admission to Japanese investors, Bangladesh is bound to extend the same treatment to Mexican investors by virtue of the MFN clause in the Mexico-Bangladesh agreement.
observations of bilateral FDI flows; and (ii) a dynamic GMM estimator accounting for possible endogeneity (see below). The PPML estimator has been suggested for gravity models on trade by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . Unlike the OLS method, the PPML estimator is consistent even in the presence of heteroskedasticity; it does not ignore zero observations.
We use fixed effects and the same model specifications as before in columns (1)- (7) of Table   1 .
The results of the PPML estimations are reported in Table 2 . The impact of several control variables is essentially as before, even though the size of coefficients is affected by the choice of the estimation method. For instance, the coefficients of GDP, DiffGDPpc and PolCon all increase considerably in size. In contrast to Table 1 , Growth now enters highly significant and positive in all PPML specifications. On the other hand, Inflation no longer discourages bilateral FDI in a significant way. The positive impact of DTT also turns out to be insignificant in Table 2 , which is partly due to the high correlation between DTTs and BITs.
As for our variables of major interest, the PPML results are very similar to the OLS results. One major exception refers to the base-line specification in column (1): while the BIT dummy enters strongly significant and positive as before, the RTA dummy completely loses its impact on bilateral FDI flows. By contrast, the significance and the size of the coefficients of RTA_with_NT in columns (2) and (3) are almost the same as in the corresponding OLS estimations. This strongly supports the earlier conclusion that foreign investors react to RTAs by expanding FDI only if the agreements offer more liberal admission rules. The coefficient of RTA_with_ISDS turns out to be negative and weakly significant, at the ten percent level, in column (3). Even though Lesher and Miroudot (2007) also find that stronger ex-post protection of foreign investors discourages FDI, this result is not particularly plausible.
Indeed, as we show further below, the impact of ISDS provisions in RTAs heavily depends on the method of estimation. In particular, endogeneity concerns appear to loom large in this respect.
OLS and PPML results closely resemble each other when combining the provisions included in RTAs and BITs in order to assess the reaction of FDI flows to more liberal admission rules and stronger dispute settlement mechanisms. The coefficients of RTA/BIT_with_NT in columns (4) and (5) are highly significant and positive as before. The size of the coefficient of RTA/BIT_with_NT increases modestly when comparing columns (5) in Tables 1 and 2 However, some of these findings weaken when employing GMM estimations that address endogeneity concerns. In particular the conclusion of BITs and the inclusion of investment-related provisions in RTAs may be the result of foreign investors pressing for liberalization and protection of already existing as well as planned engagements in developing host countries. The GMM estimations also account for similar endogeneity concerns, though less relevant in the present context, that relate to several control variables, including Growth, Openness, and DTT. We use lagged levels as well as lagged differences as instruments. The large number of country pairs ensures that the number of used instruments is always considerably below the number of observations. It should also be noted that all specifications reported in Table 3 pass the Sargan-Hansen-J test for overidentifying restrictions so that the instrument set is valid.
The dynamic GMM results reveal that bilateral FDI flows are strongly path dependent. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are highly significant, ranging from 0.717 in column (7) of Table 3 to 0.794 in column (2). Unsurprisingly the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable takes away explanatory power from some other control variables. Most notably the evidence for vertical FDI completely vanishes, with DiffGDPpc typically being insignificant in Table 3 A striking difference between the GMM estimations and the previous OLS estimations concerns ISDS provisions in RTAs. The highly significant coefficient of
RTA_with ISDS in column (3) of Table 3 suggests that their effect on FDI flows is biased downwards unless possible endogeneity is accounted for. Such a bias may occur if source country parties to RTAs pressed for stricter ISDS provisions mainly when bargaining with relatively weak host country parties where foreign investors had hardly located so far.
Possibly, these host country parties agreed to stricter ISDS provisions precisely because the prospect of contentious FDI-related disputes and the obligation to adhere to the rulings of independent arbitration panels appeared to be rather remote. However, the same reasoning should then apply to ISDS provisions in BITs. All the same, the impact on FDI is insignificant -as before in the OLS and PPML estimations -when combining ISDS provisions in RTAs with those in BITs (columns 5 and 7). It is hard to decide whether ISDS provisions in BITs are less effective than those in RTAs when accounting for possible endogeneity, or whether the difference is mainly due to the reduced sample for which ISDS provisions are available in BITs.
In another respect, the differences between RTAs and BITs narrow considerably when performing GMM estimations. Both types of agreements have at best weak effects on bilateral FDI flows in Table 3 when NT and ISDS provisions are missing. As concerns RTAs, the coefficient of RTA_w/o_NT/ISDS continues to be negative, but we no longer find substitution effects to be significant at conventional levels. As concerns BITs, they remain effective -though only at the ten percent level -in stimulating FDI as long as only NT provisions are missing, as indicated by the coefficients of BIT_w/o_NT in columns (4) and (6). In contrast to the OLS and PPML estimations, however, the coefficients of BIT_w/o_NT/ISDS prove to be insignificant in columns (5) and (7).
Summary and Conclusion
The central proposition guiding the analysis in this paper is that the extent to which international trade and investment agreements attract FDI from other parties depends on the 1,159 Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively. We use all lags available, that is, lagged levels and lagged differences. Due to the large number of country pairs, the number of instruments used is always considerably lower than the number of observations. All specifications pass the Sargan-Hansen-J statistic test for overidentifying restrictions, demonstrating that the instrument set can be considered valid. Appropriate Arrellano-Bond-tests indicate that first-order (second-order) autocorrelation is present (absent) in all regressions. See Table 1 for further notes.
